On August 4, the United States and the Cook Islands announced a bilateral cooperation agreement to advance deep-sea mining exploration in Cook Islands waters. This development comes on the heels of President Trump’s April executive order, “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources,” which opened the door for deep-sea resource exploration and extraction within U.S. territorial waters and internationally. This move raises critical questions about the impetus behind these actions and their implications for the Pacific region and global power dynamics.
The Cook Islands’ seabed mineral potential is substantial. The Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority estimates that its waters contain around 6.7 billion metric tons of polymetallic nodules, rich in cobalt, nickel, titanium, rare earth elements, and other critical metals. The Cook Islands’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) covers almost 2 million square kilometers, encompassing the Penrhyn and Samoa basin plains, where these nodules are abundant. The Seabed Minerals Authority has estimated that these nodules could produce 20 million metric tons of cobalt alone. In 2022, the Authority granted three five-year exploration licenses for polymetallic nodules within the EEZ. However, the commercial viability, environmental sustainability, and scalability of these resources remain uncertain.
The International Seabed Authority (ISA), formed in 1994 under the United Nations, regulates the exploration and extraction of mineral resources in seabeds beyond national jurisdiction. The April executive order signals a shift in Washington’s approach, preparing to pursue deep-sea mining outside the ISA’s framework. While the ISA has approved some exploration contracts in the Pacific, progress on its regulatory framework has been slow, frustrating countries and companies eager to advance critical mineral development. Deep-sea mining remains controversial, with some Pacific nations pushing to proceed and others calling for a moratorium or outright ban until environmental impacts are better understood. The U.S.-Cook Islands statement highlights Washington’s intent to seize Pacific mining opportunities, potentially creating tensions with some Pacific partners while opening new prospects.
China has been systematically establishing relationships and agreements to pursue deep-sea mining efforts in the Pacific. Holding five ISA contracts to explore for deep-sea minerals in the Pacific and Indian oceans, China has progressed furthest with the Cook Islands. In February 2025, the two countries signed the Action Plan 2025–2030 for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which includes deep-sea mining as a national priority for the Cook Islands. China’s pursuit of dual-use technologies, such as autonomous underwater vehicles, raises security concerns. If Chinese ships and remotely operated vehicles were deployed in the Pacific under the pretext of deep-sea mining, it would be difficult to determine whether their operations were strictly commercial. China’s activities in the Pacific are already disconcerting to long-standing U.S. allies and partners, particularly Australia and New Zealand.
The joint U.S.-Cook Islands statement on Seabed Mineral Resources marks a significant move by the U.S. to position itself at the forefront of deep-sea mining opportunities. The timing of this statement, just months after China signed its own MOU with the Cook Islands, highlights the geopolitical competition at play. In addition to the Cook Islands, Kiribati—which has an EEZ almost as wide as the continental United States—is exploring a mining partnership with China. This could provide Beijing with opportunities to map and maintain a presence in large swaths of strategic waters across the Pacific. The United States has struggled to keep pace with growing Chinese influence in the Pacific, and by working with the Cook Islands and establishing a path to deep-sea mining outside of the ISA, Washington could strengthen ties with Pacific states eager to advance seabed mining for economic development.
The broader implications of these developments on deep-sea mining and U.S. national interests in the Pacific are multifaceted. The Metals Company (TMC) has been quick to capitalize on this shift in U.S. policy, submitting applications to the U.S. federal government within days of the executive order. However, TMC has come under increasing scrutiny and legal action. Class action lawsuits have been filed against TMC in U.S. courts, and in July 2025, the ISA started a formal investigation into TMC for attempting to bypass ISA regulations and UNCLOS. Nonetheless, if the ISA keeps missing deadlines on its regulatory framework, more actors may bypass it, risking the ISA—and parts of UNCLOS—becoming irrelevant.
The implications for U.S. influence in the Pacific are less clear. Until recently, the United States has largely stayed out of the fray, preferring to wait until the ISA completed its review and established clear regulations. The April executive order and recent joint statement with the Cook Islands, however, have the United States clearly throwing its lot in with the pro-deep-sea mining team. This move could strengthen ties